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APPENDIX,  
CONTAINING SOME  
REFLECTIONS

UPON  
M<sup>r</sup>. WEBSTER'S

Displaying of  
Supposed *WITCH-CRAFT*,

WHEREIN

He handles the EXISTENCE and NATURE  
of ANGELS and SPIRITS.

---

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Hen. Brome*, at the *Gun*, at the West-  
end of *S. Pauls Church*, 1678.

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## *Reflections on Mr. Webster's Discourses against the Incor- poreity of Angels or Spirits.*

**W**Hile the fore-going Treatise of Angels was under the Press, there came to my hands a learned and laborious Volume of Mr. *John Webster*, Practitioner in Physick, call'd, *The Displaying of supposed Witchcraft*, wherein also he discourseth of the Existence and Nature of Angels and Spirits. Upon the perusal of which I have noted some things, which I conceive it pertinent for me to reflect here a little upon.

*The occasion and scope of the ensuing Reflections.*

I shall not presume to censure any thing of the main design and scope of this industrious Author, in the prosecution of which he hath indeed heap'd together many rare and excellent Observations, worthy to be considered of for the improving Knowledge, and rendring all men cautious, how they pronounce of such abstruse Subjects.

Much less shall I espouse any man's particular Hypothesis and Quarrel; or attempt the Defence of those eminently worthy Persons, whom he hath singled out for his Antagonists, the Reverend and Learned Divines, Dr. *Casaubon*, Mr. *Glanvil*, Dr. *H. More*, who are better able and more concern'd to speak for themselves. Onely I wish for his own  
sake

Pag. 51. fake, that he had treated them with more respective terms, than those of *Scurrilous, Impudent, Witch-mongers*,——which he so freely bestows; as also that aspersion, which he casts upon the Pious and profoundly Learned Dr. *Hammond*, [*That he is almost every-where guilty of vain Traditional Fancies.*]

Pag. 275. These are Epithetes, which, however they might be pardoned in a Practitioner of Physick, whom Age and Infirmities may have made forward and waspish, are not so agreeable to his other Character, as a Presbyter of this Church, (ordained long since by the Right Reverend Dr. *Tho. Merton* Bishop of *Durham*) and Curate of *Kildwick* about the Year 1634, as himself acquaints us, though he wholly baulk his Spiritual Titles in the Front of his Book, as one that glories rather in another Function.

Pag. 277. I do heartily both approve and commend his Piety in acquiescing, as he professeth, in the determinations of holy Scripture, and fully accord with him in what he lays down for the Rule of proceeding in these Controversies.

Chap. 4. [The Word of God, saith he, is the most proper  
P. 49, 50. medium, with sound Reason, to judge of the power of Spirits and Devils by.——And again, That the Scriptures and sound Reason are the only true and proper Medium to decide these Controversies by, is most undeniably apparent, because God is a Spirit, and the invisible God, and therefore best knows the nature and power of the spiritual and invisible world, and, being the God of truth, can and doth inform us.——Nay he is the Father of Spirits, and therefore truly knows, and can and doth teach us their Natures, Offices and Operations.——And again, The Scriptures and sound Reason are the most fit Medium to determine these things by.]



Particularly he speaks of the Humane Soul, Angels, and Devils.

1. *The Word of God, saith he, doth particularly teach us the state and condition of Souls after death, that they shall be like the Angels in Heaven, and all other things necessary to move and draw us to believe the immortal existence of Souls.* — Pa. 44, 45.

2. *Hath not God in the holy Scriptures amply and plainly laid down the state of the other world, in describing to us such a numerous Company of Seraphims and Cherubims, Angels and Arch-Angels, with their several Orders, Offices, Ministries, and Employments?* — Ibid.

3. *The Scriptures do fully and abundantly inform us of the Devil's spiritual and invisible power, and against the same declare unto us the whole Armour of God, with which we ought to be furnished, as the Apostle saith, Ephes. 6.* Pag. 47.

Now that which I purpose to observe and examine, is chiefly this, how consistent our Author is to himself; and how well he hath acquitted him, according to these Rules and Measures, in his Discourses of Angels and Spirits. And that so far only, as I apprehend my self concern'd by some things which I have asserted and declared in the precedent Treatise.

I have suggested in the Epistle Dedicatory, that *the general dis-belief of Spirits may well be thought an Introduction to all manner of Irreligion and Profaneness; which brings me in part under that condemnation, wherein he involves both Dr. Casaubon and Mr. Glanvil; The one for saying, [One prime foundation of Atheism, as by many ancient and late is observed, being the not belief of Spiritual Beings—] The other for affirming, [Those that will not bluntly say, there is no God, content themselves for a fair step and introduction, to deny there are Spirits.—] In opposition to whom he asserts, that* *The Deny- al of Spi- rits a step to Atheism.* Chap. 3: P. 37.

P. 38, 39. *the denying of the Existence of Spirits doth not infer the denying of the Being of God; because God might be without them; and God was before them; and the Sadducees believed a God, allowing of the Books of Moses, &c. as he discourseth more at large.*

Now this formal arguing of his, as I conceive, is weak and trifling. For (to say nothing, that such Ethical propositions, as these should not be scann'd over-rigidly, but construed sometimes, *cum grano salis*, as holding ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ,) However there might be a God, though there were neither Angels nor Devils in *rerum natura*, yet those that deny in general the being of Spirits, do therein implicitly impugn the being of God, who is a Spirit, whether themselves know and consider it, or no.

And, as some have justified the Truth of that Royal Maxime, [No Bishop, No King] against them who would prove, (in like manner as this Author pleads) that there is no necessary and immediate connexion of the terms, Bishop and King; or no essential dependence of King upon Bishop; because nevertheless they, that have opposed Bishops in the Church, have been generally also against a King in the State; and the same Antimonarchical principle inclines them to oppose both; so may we answer here; and 'tis to be observed, among our modern Atheists and Sadducees especially, that their antipathy and aversation, as to the notion and being of Spirits universally, hath carried them on (and naturally doth so) to the dethroning of God, the Supreme Spirit, and Father of Spirits.

Ibid;

And although, as he farther saith, *God had been God, though he had not been Creator; or there might be a God, though there were no Creation.* — [Such a God as Epicurus and his Followers, *ad vitandam*

*vitandam invidiam*, acknowledg] yet should not I question to tax that person with real Atheism, who denies a God under that notion, as the ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν, the first cause of all things, the Maker and Governor of the World; especially, since the Apostle hath taught us, that *The invisible things* Rom. I. *of him from the Creation of the World are cleerly seen,* 20. *being understood by the things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead, so that they [even the Heathen] are without excuse.*

Those persons certainly (suppose we never so charitably, as *Salvian* saith of the *Arrians*, that they may *bono animo errare*) contribute very much towards the countenancing and support of Atheism among men, who banish the belief of Incorporeal Beings out of the World as mere jargon, and a thing, which no man whatever he talks, can possibly understand.

And though I am far enough from insinuating this Author to be such an one; since he openly professeth his belief of God, the humane Soul, Angels and Devils, and of all the holy Scripture which declareth these things to our faith; and because there are some, who by the goodness of their nature, and prevalence of some better principles, may not be effectually and in practice, what otherwise certain evil tenets would incline them to be: Many are too dull and stupid to understand or consider of the fatal and pernicious consequences of their own Opinions; and others are too vertuously qualified, to be influenced by them; Yet it may not be amiss for him seriously to reflect and weigh within himself, what a bad use others at least may make of such assertions of his, as these are that follow.

*There is no common notion*, saith he, *of a spiritual and immaterial Being in all or any man.* — And again confidently,

*Dangerous Positions of Mr. W. against the Idea of a Spirit, and of God.*  
P. 198.

We

Ibid.

We assert, that our faculties, or cognitive Powers (how far soever some would magnifie and extol them) have not the power of understanding Beings, that are simply and absolutely immaterial and incorporeal.--And again,

P. 207.

Those, that pretend Angels are merely incorporeal, must needs err, and put force upon their own faculties, which cannot conceive a thing, that is not continue and corporeal.

Now if no man have, or can have, the notion of a spiritual and immaterial Being; if our cognitive powers cannot understand it; if our faculties cannot conceive of it; what, I pray, will become of the Being of God in the World, as a Spirit, and the Father of Spirits? How ready is every one to discard, what he cannot frame a notion of, what he cannot possibly conceive or understand? Nay, how should his mind ever entertain, or assent to it? And we must needs infer, upon this supposal, that he who professeth, God is a Spirit, as our Author doth, makes of him only [*nomen inane*] a bare and empty name, gives him an insignificant attribute, and believes and speaks, he knows not what.

But then farther our Author excepts against the Idea of God in particular.

P. 201.

God in his own nature being infinite and incomprehensible, there can be no true and adequate notion of him. — And again,

Ibid.

— Much more must the being of God, which is infinite and incomprehensible, which are attributes incommunicable, be utterly inconceivable to any of our faculties.

Let him go now and dispute the case with the Apostle Saint Paul, Rom. 1. 20, 21, &c. That which may be known of God is manifest in them, [even the Gentiles] for God hath shewed unto them, [*ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξουσίας*]. And this τὸ γνωστὸν τῆς θεᾶς, which he saith,



faith to be *φανερὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς*, is no other than the *τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτῶν*, *The invisible things of God*, which I mention'd before, *even his eternal power and God-head*; And these too are so far said to be manifested to them, as to leave them *without excuse or apology*; For *not glorifying him as God*, [even the invisible God] *but changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an Image made like to corruptible man, &c.* — i. e. a corporeal Image. Which, if I mistake not, sufficiently includes incorporeity among the rest in the Idea to be had of him, — And here I call to mind two notable sayings of the Fathers, worthy to be written in Letters of Gold. The one of Saint Cyprian, of the Vanity of Idols, *Hæc est summa delicti, nolle agnoscere, quem ignorare non possis.* The other of Lactantius, who is a strenuous Asserter of Religion's being the chief property and distinction of man from the Beasts; *Quam sibi veniam sperare possunt impietatis suæ, qui non agnoscunt cultum ejus, quem prorsus ignorari ab homine fas non est?*

This Gentleman should do well to consider better, that it is one thing, to conceive, that there is such a Being, whose perfections we cannot fathom; and another, fully and adequately to comprehend him; one thing to conceive truly, and another to understand adequately; for there is somewhat incomprehensible to us in the nature and essence of all things else, as well as God's, and we may every-where almost write Mystery, and *ὦ ἄβυσσος!* and *ἔκτετα μέλαν.*

It is the commendation, I think, of the Idea or Notion of God in our Souls, if it be such for perfection, as, had it not been implanted within us, we could scarce collect our selves from any thing without.

But, whatever there be in that, I would gladly

In c. 21.  
Epist. En-  
chirid.

ly know, if this All-perfect, Infinite and Incomprehensible Being, [Πάντων ἀκρότης, as *Simplicius* well stiles him] is utterly unconceivable to any of our faculties, how he or any other comes to believe and assert the Divine Nature to be thus Infinite and Incomprehensible in all Perfections; or, how there can be an obligation upon others to believe and profess, what is utterly unconceivable.

And now I pass on to what he discourseth of the Nature of Angels.

Self-Stu-  
dy and re-  
flection the  
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ready Me-  
thod to the  
Notion of  
Spirits.

I have endeavour'd in the Treatise of Angels, to give as plain, familiar and useful a description, as I could, of the notion of Spirits, from a serious reflection made upon our own Soul or Spirit, *Ch. 2. Sect. 1.* and represented them by such attributes, as I conceive most proper and characteristical. The Delphick Oracle Γνώθι σεαυτὸν, which sends us to study our selves, directs us certainly to the readiest course of natural, as well as Moral Philosophy; and the genuine knowledg of the little World of Man is the best preparative for the understanding of the greater, and him, that made both.

P. 199.

Our Author grants, that *All substances are known by their properties and Modifications.* If then we can find out any such properties or attributes, as are no ways agreeable unto matter, we have sufficiently the notion of a Spirit, that is, an immaterial or incorporeal Being. And such we may be satisfied of by inspection made into our selves.—Were there no other but those two powers, we may every one be conscious of; a power, I mean, of reflecting upon our own thoughts, and a power of moving and determining our own wills, as well as bodies; this ἐαυταυτοψία, if I may so speak, and ἀντοκίνησις; or, ἀντηξέσις, (the  
root

root and foundation of all morality) is altogether incompetent unto Matter. For where is there any thing of Matter, that can possibly reflect upon its individual self, or freely move it self? Those who own nothing in the World but Body, must banish Conscience and subscribe to Fatal necessity, &c. It is confess'd, when we have sum'd up all, that we know but very little of any thing; and may have Sense enough of our own Imperfection and Ignorance to keep us humble: Yet, since we know so little, we had not need to make that little less; and 'tis sufficient, I should think, that we know as much (or rather more) of Spirit, as we do of Body. And of Body our Author himself tells us, over and over; *The Intrinsic Nature of Body as such is utterly unknown to us.* — *It's Internal Nature, quatenus Corpus, is utterly unknown* — and again — *We know not the Intrinsic Nature of Body:* — And yet but a little before he had said, — *We must with all the whole company of the learned assign Extension to be the True and Genuine Character, or Characteristical Property, as he else-where phraseth it, of Body.* — And, if this be yielded, what should reasonably be desired more, when himself confesseth, that *All Substances are known by their properties and modifications?* as I even now observed.

I will not stay to dispute the point farther, or to examine, whether that wonderful Body, as he calls it, *Image or Idolum in a Mirrour or Looking-Glass, be as really a Body as any in the Universe,* as he affirms. Let him admire and play, as he please, with his own Shadow.

But this I observe, that Contradictions seem frequently to lie in his Head together, (if we may guess at what was there, by that which drops from his Pen) as if he were really *ἀνὴρ δι' ἑαυτοῦ*, *Master W's contradictions both about Body and Spirit.*

N

partaker

De animâ  
Brutorum  
c. 7.

partaker of two distinct and contrary Souls, [in another Sense than St. James useth the word, which we English double-minded, ch. 1. 8. or Dr. Willis physically defends the thing]. For my part I am no ways able to reconcile his ~~reasons~~ *αὐτάρ*

Thus we find him thwarting of himself, both about Body and Spirits.

As to Body, besides what I have already noted, he tells us,

P. 205.

— *Penetration of Bodies is simply unintelligible and impossible to conceive* — as certainly it is. And yet we have him afterwards very favourable and yielding to his most admired *Helmont's* Penetration of Dimensions ——— *The Arguments*, saith he, *that he bringeth to prove Penetration of Dimensions to be in Nature, or something equivalent thereunto, seem to be strong and convincing.* — There may, it seems, be convincing Arguments with him for what is simply unintelligible and impossible to conceive, or equivalent thereunto.

P. 255,  
256, &c.

But then, as to Spirits, which is the subject I am chiefly concern'd about, I fix especially upon his tenth Chapter, and shall make the charge of Contradictions abundantly good, as I pass along in the examining of certain Periods of it, compared with what he there, or elsewhere, offereth dispersedly in his Book.

The humane Soul excluded by him from this disquisition about Angels for three pretended reasons.

P. 202.

In the handling this point, saith he, of the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels, we do here, once for all, exclude and except forth of our discourse and arguments the humane and rational Soul, as not at all to be comprized in these limits. And that especially for these reasons. 1. Because the humane Soul had a peculiar kind of Creation, differing from the Creation of other things, as appeareth in the words of the Text, Gen. 2. 7. And the Lord God formed man of the Dust of the Ground, and breathed into him the Breath



Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul. Upon which the Note of Tremellius and Junius is, *Anima vero hominis spiritale quiddam est & Divinum.* That note of theirs he gives more at large, Ch. P. 314.

16. *Ut clarius appareat discrimen inter animam hominis & reliquorum animantium: horum enim animæ ex eadem materia provenerunt, unde corpora habebant; illius vero anima spiritale quiddam & divinum.* 2. Because I find Solomon, the wisest of men, making this question, Who knoweth the Spirit of Man, that goeth upward; and the Spirit of the Beast, that goeth downward to the Earth? *Eccles. 3. 21.* 3. Because it is safer to believe the nature of the Soul to be according to the Analogy of Faith, and the concurrent opinion of the Learned, than to sift such a deep question by our weak understanding and reason.

Now it is, to my apprehension, extremely unreasonable, that in the entrance of this enquiry the Soul of Man should be exempted from it; and seems like the odd practice of cunning men at Law, who secure such as are like to give in a casting evidence against their Cause. For it is manifest enough, that Angels are a sort of Beings superiour unto the humane Soul, as I have shewn in the foregoing Treatise, Ch. 1. Sect. 2.

If then it be apparent and undeniable, (as I shall make good anon from this Author's concessions) that the Soul of Man is truly incorporeal; the conviction and evidence from hence, as to Angels, will be as great as can be desired; to which purpose I have also reasoned, Ch. 2. Sect. 1.

And, if it be certainly true, that we can conceive such a spiritual Being, as the humane Soul is granted by him to be; it will then be utterly false, that an immaterial Being is utterly unconceivable by us, as he asserts.

*This method of procedure unreasonable.*

I have quoted this saying from him already, but shall take occasion once more to repete it, together with the proof, such as it is, which he tenders for it.

p. 207.

*Those that pretend, saith he, that Angels are meerly incorporeal, must needs err, and put force upon their own faculties, which cannot conceive a thing, that is not continue and corporeal.*

Now this conclusion or inference of his he grounds upon a School-Maxime, as he tells us, thus,

p. 206.

*Imaginatio non transcendit continuum. And this, saith he, if we perpend it seriously, is a most certain and transcendent truth, for when we come to cogitate and conceive of a thing, we cannot apprehend it otherwise, than as continue and corporeal.*

Master W.  
confounds  
Imagination  
and Intellect,  
which else-  
where he  
knew well  
to distin-  
guish.  
p. 204.

In which discourse he grossly confounds Imagination and Intellect together, as if they were one and the same thing; and we could not cogitate, apprehend and conceive that at all, which we cannot imagine or draw a Picture of in our phansie. An assertion, which argues somewhat of a stupified understanding. He himself hath else-where better distinguished, *It is one thing, saith he, truly to understand, and another thing to imagine or fancie.* And he had learn't as much, as he tells us, had he but seriously perpended it here, from the learned Doctor Willis, *De animâ Brutorum*, in these words which he cites with commendation out of him.

p. 317.  
Ibid.

— *Intellect and Imagination are not wont to agree in many things.*—] And again, *In man there is a double cognitive power, to wit, the Intellect and Imagination. So there is a double appetite, the Will proceeding from the Intellect, which is the Page or Servant of the rational Soul, and the sensitive appetite, which cohereing to the Imagination is said to be the Hands,*

*Hands, or Procuratrix, of the corporeal Soul.*

Imagination then is a sensitive and corporeal faculty, and therefore no wonder, if it cannot transcendere continuum; but Understanding or Intellect a rational and incorporeal power, and therefore able to conceive and apprehend things like it-self. The Objects as well as Acts, of the one and other, are vastly different. Though the near and intimate union of our Souls to these Bodies of Earth wherein they dwell, makes it difficult for us to abstract our thoughts altogether from sensible and corporeal Images — *In quo nihil est difficilius, quam à consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere*, as *Balbus* in *Cicero* hath it. Yet, difficult though it be, 'tis not impossible, but the daily experience of contemplative minds. Every faculty is concern'd in its proper object, and to be employed about it: The Eye for seeing, the Ear for hearing; the Palate for tasting, &c. So among the external senses. And so in like manner it is with the internal powers: The Fancy is for imagining, and the Intellect for abstract thinking or conceiving, even what we cannot imagin; Metaphysical, Logical, Moral Universal Verities, *rationes veri & falsi, boni & mali*, God and Divine things, — &c. We may as well taste Light and Colours, and see Sounds, as imagine a Spirit; but yet for all that we may think and conceive of it. I will dismiss this with the words of *Max. Tyrius*, *ὅς νουτὰ ὁρᾷ, καὶ νουτῶν ἀκούει καὶ διαφέρει νουτῶν ἀιδήτους, ὅσον νῦν ἀιδήτους.*

De Nat.  
Deorum,  
l. 2.

Dissert. 1.

And now I will shew, as I promised, that our Author had some notion of an incorporeal Being, because he plainly and often asserts the reasonable or humane Soul to be such.

Master W.  
asserts the  
Incorporeity of the  
humane  
Soul.

† The Rational and immortal Soul he owns expressly to be a Spirit, quoting that of our blessed

- p. 314. Saviour for it, *Father into thy hands I commend my Spirit.* — *An incorporeal substance, and therefore immortal,* saith he out of *Gassendus*. And so he
- p. 315. expounds that Text of Saint Paul, *1 Thes. 5. 23.*
- p. 316. which makes the whole of man to consist in *Spirit, Soul and Body.* The Spirit, that is, saith he, the *rational mind.* And he well approves of Doctor Willis his arguments and proofs for two distinct Souls in man, *The one sensitive and corporeal, and the other rational and incorporeal.*
- p. 317.
- p. 318. Nay, saith he, *The Soul by the unanimous consent of all men is a spiritual and pure, immaterial and incorporeal substance.* And,
- Ibid. *It is manifest by divine Authority, that the Spirit, that is, the rational immortal and incorporeal Soul, doth return to God, and exist eternally.* — And again,
- p. 320. *It is most evident, that there are not only three essential and distinct parts in man, as the gross Body consisting of Earth and Water, which at Death returns to Earth again, the sensitive and corporeal Soul or Astral Spirit, (as he calls it) consisting of Fire and Air, that at death wandreth in the Air, or neer the Body; and the immortal and incorporeal Soul, that immediately returns to God, that gave it; But also, that after death they all three exist separately; the Soul in immortality, and the Body in the Earth, though soon consuming, and the Astral Spirit wandring in the Air, and without doubt doth make these strange Apparitions and Bleedings.* —
- We have then here a notion, a manifest and most evident notion, and that, as he saith, by the universal consent of all Men, as well as Divine Authority, of a spiritual and pure, immaterial and incorporeal substance, and that existing separately and by it self in immortality, which is the thing he said our faculties cannot conceive of.

And



And this, I suppose, whatever is pretended, was the principal inducement to his excepting so solicitously the humane and rational Soul from his intended discourse of the corporeity of Angels.

But we will view his three Reasons, alledged for this Exception, more distinctly, as they lie in order.

First, saith he, because the humane Soul had a peculiar kind of Creation differing from the Creation of other things, as appeareth in the words of the Text, Gen. 2. 7. And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into him the breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul. Upon which the Note of Tremellius and Junius is, *Anima verò hominis spiritale quiddam est & divinum.* Or more at large, as he cites it, p. 314. Thus in English, *That the difference between Man and other Animals might appear more clearly: for the Souls of these came out of the same matter, from whence they had their Bodies, but his Soul was a certain Spiritual and Divine thing.*

Now it is evident, upon first sight, that Tremellius and Junius here [for I take his word for the Quotation, not meeting with it in their Notes on the place] did not intend to lay down any difference between the creation of the Soul of Man, and of Angels, [which alone would serve his purpose] but of Man and other Animals only, produced out of matter. And therefore this could not be a reason for excepting the humane Soul from the dispute of Angels.

But yet it may be worth the while to stay a little upon the Text referr'd to, for our better acquaintance with our selves, and so a greater preparedness for the conception of material and immortal substances.

*An Examination of his three Reasons for excepting the humane Soul from this enquiry. Of his first Reason.*

[ A short  
Comment  
upon Gen  
2. 7. con-  
cerning  
Man's Ori-  
ginal. ]

*The Lord God, saith the Text, formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his Nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living Soul.—— His Body made of Earth, but his Soul the Breath of God.*

— *Divina particula Aure.*

*Horat.*

We must not understand it grossly; for so Breath is not attributable unto God, who is a simple and perfect Spirit; but, *θεογενής*, as a figurative expression of God's communicating unto Man that inward Principle, whereby he lives and acts, not only in common with, but in a degree above other Animals. *Vatablus* therefore renders it by [*injecerat, sive immiserat*] *He put or conveyed into his body a vital Spirit.* And so *Junius* and *Tremellius*, in their Notes upon the place tell us, [*humanitus dictum, pro eo, quod ex virtute sui æterni spiritus, &c.*] *It is spoken after the manner of men; and the meaning is this, that by virtue of his Eternal Spirit, without any Elementary matter, he inspired a Vital Soul (which is by nature a simple form) into that Elementary Body, that it might use as an Instrument.* And Man became a living Soul ] *that is, say they, [quum virtute Dei fuit anima corpori adunata in unitatem personæ, &c.] 'when by the power of God the Soul was thus united to the body in one person, the Earthy Statue became indued with life, and was reckoned a principal species of Animals.—— To a like purpose saith Clarus, The Souls of other living Creatures were [de materiâ eductæ] brought forth of matter. Gen. 1. 20, 21. Let the waters bring forth the moving Creature, that hath life, and let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind. But the Soul of Man was [foris inspirata] from God immediately. And thus much*

*Job*

Job also acknowledgeth ; *The Spirit of God*, saith he, *hath made me*, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life, — Ch. 33.4.

The Learned *P. Fagius* takes notice of three things in the Text of *Moses*, which do conclude the Immortality of the Soul of Man.

I. *Insufflatio illa Dei.* ] *This Inspiration from God spoken of: For he that breaths into another, contributes unto him [aliquid de suo] somewhat of his own: And therefore, saith he, when our B. Saviour would communicate his Spirit to his Disciples, he did it with Insufflation, breathing on them, thereby to signify, se Divinum & de suo quiddam illis contribuere.*

II. *The Original word Nischmath, which we render Breath, or Spirit, derived from שׁמַיִם Heaven, imports somewhat Divine and Celestial.*

III. *The word Hajim added to it, sounds plurally [spiraculum vitarum] the breath of lives. [Non simpliciter vitam, sed longævam significat] a long and continuing life; or, as some will have it, being of the dual number, [præsentis & futuri sæculi vitam] the life of this and the other world: Or, if I may add a farther conjecture, both the rational and sensitive life.*

What is here declared by *Moses* of Man's Origination, was notably emblem'd out in the Fable of *Prometheus*, which is by interpretation Providence: where the Body is said to have been [è molli luto] of soft and yielding Clay. [And such we must suppose the dust of the Earth in *Genesis*, Earth temper'd and prepared with moisture, è pulvere sub. jam macerato ac temperato imbri qui deciderat. q. d. ex massâ quadam terræ madefactâ, as *Vatablus* hath it] but the Soul [ignis de Cælo] a fire or spark taken from Heaven.

And agreeable to this first Production of Man  
is

is the description which *Solomon* gives us of his dissolution, *Eccles.* 12. 7. [whereof I have spoken in the foregoing Treatise, comparing it with *Phocylides* and *Lucretius*, *Ch.* 11. §. 1.] from whence we learn, saith *Drusius*, how far this wise-man was from their Heresie, who think that the Soul of man is mortal, and doth *una cum corpore interire*, perish with the body. A Note I shall have occasion to make farther use of by and by. And *Elihu* in the Book of *Job* phraseth man's dissolution much like *Solomon*, *If he* [i. e. *God*] *gather unto himself his spirit and breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again to his dust.*—But enough of this digression.

Of his  
second  
Reason.

I proceed to our Author's second Reason: (2) saith he, *because I find Solomon, the wisest man, making this Question*, Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the Earth? *Eccles.* 3. 21.]

How well now doth this second Reason hit and accord with the first! There he told us, from *Junius* and *Tremellius*, the plain distinction between the spirit of man, and the souls of other Animals, as a more Divine Being; and here he starts forthwith upon it a sceptical doubt or question out of *Ecclesiastes*, that seems plainly to confound both together: And he sets it off too with the commendation of *Solomon's* Eximious Wisdom; as if he had given us in it the inward sense of his own wisely-searching mind. We had need of good assurance of our Authors right belief in this matter, to construe his meaning in this al'edgment.

P. 105.

It were seasonable here to immind him of his own saying in another case. [It is a very froward and perverse way of arguing, to make one place of Scripture

to



to clash with another.] And to bring into his memory one of his Rules for the interpretation of H. Scripture. [That there be a due comparing of the Antecedents and Consequents in the Context; that the purpose, scope, theme, arguments, disposition and method may be perfectly and maturely considered; otherwise by the slighting or omitting any one of these particular points, the whole place may be mistaken, and an error easily fallen into.] P. 137.

*Turpe est doctori.*——

According to this good Rule therefore I will endeavour an Explication of this Text of Solomon's, which the Friends of Atheism, Epicurism, and Profaneness are fond enough of, and our Author, it seems, leaves them to chew the Cud upon. The entire period runs thus:

[I said in my heart, concerning the state of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts: For that which befallerh the sons of men, befallerh the beasts; even one thing befallerh them. As the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no preheminnence above a beast, for all is vanity. All go unto one place: All are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the Earth? ——]

An Explication and Vindication of Eccles. 3. 18-21. from the Atheistical and Profane.

These words now, at the reading of them, may be thought by some to herd Man absolutely, as a Fellow-commoner, among the Beasts. But if we duly consider them, together with the Context, and the several constructions which they admit of otherwise, we shall be able to satisfy our selves and others to the contrary.

The wise Solomon, in the Verses immediately prece-

precedent to this discourse, rationally infers a future Judgment of God from the irregularities and disorders apparent in Humane Judicatories. Vers. 16, 17. *I saw under the Sun the place of Judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of Righteousness, that iniquity was there. I said in my heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked: For there is a time there for every purpose, and for every work.* Now what can be more directly cross and destructive to this Pious Inference of a Judgment to come, which shall rectifie and set streight the enormities of Earthly Tribunals, than an Opinion, that Men are as the Beasts, and so are not accountable for what they do, or end their accounts with this present life; and therefore need not at all trouble themselves with the forethoughts and fears, because they are not in a capacity of being call'd to a future reckoning: What I say can be more contradictory to his Religious scope and purpose than this? — Some other sense then we must of necessity fix upon.

*Junius* and *Tremellius* (whom I the rather mention for our Author's sake) tell us, that the Wise Man having before express'd a true account and judgment upon those oppressions, confusions and disorders which he had observed under the Sun, doth here subjoyn [*judicium ex sensu carnis profectum*] another-guise sentence or opinion arising from Carnal Sense: And this whole period, say they, is [*Narratio carnalis disceptationis ac judicii*] a Declaration of Carnal Reason only in the case. — Thus therefore they read the words [*Dixeram ego cum animo meo secundum rationem humanam* —] *I said with my heart, according to humane reasoning thus and thus.* — And then of the 21 Vers. particularly they add, [*Ironica confutatio, quâ utitur caro adversus piam doctrinam de differentiâ inter ani-*  
mas,

*mas, & eventu ex morte*] It is an Ironical or Mock-confutation, which the *Flesh* useth against the pious Doctrine of the difference between Souls, and that which follows upon death. q. d. I hear I know not what whisper'd of the substance of Man's Soul, that it is heavenly, and that it goes to Heaven at death: And on the other side, that the soul of beasts is a certain Earthy faculty, so adhering unto body, that it cannot be separated without it's own destruction. But who, I wonder, hath seen the one or other, either or both of these? It is a more certain course therefore to pass a judgment of both from those common facts and events which are before our eyes.—Thus far they.

And this also is the periwasion of *Munster*, that these things are here spoken [*secundum stultam opinionem pecuniorum hominum*] according to the foolish opinion of brutish men, who conceit that the whole Man doth perish by death, as other Animals, and therefore repute it the chiefest happiness to ~~in-~~ *immerse* themselves in all voluptuousness, while they live, seeking their portion in this life only: To which purpose also it follows immediately, by way of inference, Vers. 22. Wherefore I perceive that there is nothing better, than that a man should rejoyce in his own works, for that is his portion; for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?

As the Apostle reasons in behalf of a future state——1 Cor. 15. 30, 32. Why stand we in jeopardy every hour? &c. Let us eat and drink, for to morrow we die.—The right Epicurean reasoning here in *Ecclesiastes*, *Ede bibe, lude, post mortem nulla voluptas*.—But S. Paul adds a peculiar Caution against it, as dangerous kind of talk, whatever wisdom some think in it, Vers. 33. Be not deceived, saith he, evil communications corrupt good manners.

The Learned *Grotius* too gives us in effect a  
like

like gloss upon this period. [*Contra illam cogitationem de judicio futuri ævi, de quâ Sermo præcessit, alia mihi cogitatio suborta est, &c.*] Against that meditation of judgment in the world to come, of which the words before made mention, another thought rose in my mind, that God doth permit men thus to live together, [ferino more] in the manner of beasts, thereby the better to declare and shew, that men are as the beasts. And to this thought in his mind, saith Grotius, he adds it's Arguments. — But then on the 21 Verſ. he paraphraſeth thus; Who knoweth the ſpirit of man that goeth upward? ] whether it abide and remain as a thing Celestial? And the ſpirit of the beaſt that goeth downward to the Earth? ] whether it periſh as the body that is laid under ground? — And his Note upon it is, That Man by his meer Natural Reaſon [*ſolâ nativâ ratione*] hath no evident certainty about this matter; and he doubts, ſaith he, of Socrates, Tully, and Seneca, ſhew as much. — They had not, I confeſs, the compleat aſſurance vouchſafed us by the help of a Diviner Revelation, which hath brought Life and Immortality to light: But yet we find in them, even in their ſtate of darkneſs, ſuch ſtrength of Reaſon and Argument ſometimes urged, that might well lay the Foundation of a greater confidence than at other times they diſcovered. And *Simplicius*, as I remember, acquaints us, that *Socrates* ſpent the time immediately before his death [the ſeaſon of greateſt Tryal] in diſcourſing ſtrenuouſly of the Immortality of the Soul, and recommending a Philoſophical preparation for another life.

*Vatablus* lets us underſtand, that ſome read the Words thus. [*Æſtimavi autem in animo meo conditionem hominum, &c.*] 'I have weighed in my mind the condition of Men, how God made them  
' moſt



‘most excellent, and yet they may seem, or one  
‘would think that saw them, that they are Beasts  
‘to themselves, in their own Judgment, as the  
‘Beasts; *q. d.* so great Ignorance nevertheless doth  
‘rule in Mens Hearts that they seem not to differ  
‘from the Beasts.

That therefore of the Psalmist is by some accommodated to this place, *Man being in Honour without understanding becometh like the Beasts that perish.* Now therefore, though he was made to be Immortal, he is excused no more from Death, than other Creatures. *Drusus.*—And so possibly, when the Wise-man saith, *Who knoweth the Spirit of Man, that goeth upward, &c.* By Spirit here may be meant [*πνεῦμα*, *aura vitalis*, *aer spirabilis*,] the Vital Breath, in which sense we say [*Spiritum accipere & reddere.*] And this Spirit or Breath may be said to go [upward or downward] according to the different posture of the Body of Man and Beast, the one with his countenance erect, the other inclined to the Earth.

*Pronaque cum spectant animalia cætera terram, Ovid. Met.*  
*Os homini sublime dedit, cælumque tueri, &c.*

But if we take *Spirit* here for the Soul it self, we may render [*Quis novit?*] with *Drusus*, by [*pauci noverunt*] or, with *Clarius*, [*Quam rarus est, qui interim id novit?*] ‘How few know the difference between the Spirit of Man and that of the Beast? As, when the same Wiseman saith elsewhere, *A vertuous woman who can find?* his meaning is not, that such an one is not at all to be found, but [*rara est inventu*] she is hard to be found; as the good and wise have been in all ages——*rari nantes in gurgite vasto.* So here, [*tantum sciunt sapientes, & qui ab illis didicerunt,*]  
‘none

'none but the wise and such as have learn't of them ken the difference. Or rather thus, [*Quis novit? Scilicet eventis communibus? nam inde discerni nequit spiritus hominis à spiritu bestiarum.*] 'Who that looks only upon common events; 'who, that keeps only to the visible effects, ordinarily taken notice of at the death of either, 'can understand the difference? —

And yet notwithstanding all this a wide difference there is. When Man's breath goeth forth and he giveth up the Ghost, his Soul or Spirit doth undeniably *return unto God that gave it*; as this Wiseman plainly asserts afterwards, *Ch. 12. 7. to God to be judged*, [*μετὰ δὲ τῷ θεῷ κρίσας*, *Heb. 9. 27.*] And such a judgment he had spoken of immediately before this period, *Ver. 17.* which could not possibly be, if Man died, as the Beasts, and his Soul perished with his Body.

So that by the help of our Author's wholesome rule, comparing the words of *Solomon* with their Antecedents and Consequents, we may be able to vindicate this wisest of men from an imputation of siding with sensual Fools and Epicures in the matter before us. And the Rule prescribed hath this real commendation, that it hath long since been given. *Qui non advertit quod supra & infra est in sacris libris, pervertit verba Dei viventis.*

To conclude this subject. It is lively represented to us in the second Chapter of the Book of *Wisdom* as the speech of the wicked and unwise. — 'The ungodly said, reasoning with 'themselves, [*as we have found it in Solomon*] but 'not aright. Our life is short and tedious, and 'in the death of man there is no remedy. — For 'we are born at all adventure, and we shall be 'hereafter as though we had never been: For the  
breath

‘breath in our Nostrils is a smoak, and a little  
 ‘spark in the moving of our heart, which being  
 ‘extinguished, our body shall be turned into  
 ‘ashes, and our spirit shall vanish as the soft air.—  
 ‘Come on therefore, let us enjoy the good things  
 ‘that are present——[These are our only por-  
 ‘tion] Let us oppress the poor righteous man.—  
 ‘Let our strength be the Law of Justice, &c.  
 ‘Such things they did imagine, and were decei-  
 ‘ved, for their own wickedness hath blinded  
 ‘them, Vers. 21.—— And then in the next Chap-  
 ‘ter he speaks excellently of the happiness of good  
 ‘and godly men. ‘The souls of the righteous are  
 ‘in the hand of God; [Father, into thy hands I  
 ‘commend my spirit] and there shall no torment  
 ‘touch them. In the sight of the unwise they  
 ‘seemed to die, and their departure is taken for  
 ‘misery, and their going from us to be utter de-  
 ‘struction: But they are in peace; for though  
 ‘they be punished in the sight of men, yet is their  
 ‘hope full of Immortality.

I have taken all this pains to shew, that the wi-  
 fest of men was not of the same opinion with  
 these unwise and ungodly ones, but that he did  
 act, or rather say their part only, and *sub aliena*  
*persona loqui*, without any design to assert or con-  
 firm what he most fully confutes.

And now I see not from hence any shew of  
 Reason, why our Author should except the Ra-  
 tional Soul or Spirit from his enquiry into the  
 Nature of Angels.

I pass on therefore to his third Reason, and will  
 be briefer in all that remains, lest my discourse  
 swell beyond the bounds I intended it.

‘3. Saith he, because it is safer to believe the  
 ‘Nature of the Soul to be according to the A-  
 ‘nalogy of Faith, and the concurrent opinion of  
 O the

of his  
third  
Reason.

Theol.  
Polit. c. 14  
& 15.

'the Learned, than to sift such a deep Question  
'by our weak understanding and reason.

I hope he is not of the opinion of *Atheo-Pol.*  
'that Theology and Reason have two distinct  
'and separate Kingdoms, between which there is  
'no commerce or affinity; viz. Reason, the King-  
'dom of Truth, and *Sapience*; Theology, of Piety  
'and Obedience only; and accordingly, that our  
'Faith requires not *vera, sed pia dogmata*. — But I  
rather construe this as an expression of his tender-  
ness and modesty only.

p. 318.

And yet, as deep a Question as this is, he tells  
us elsewhere, *The unanimous consent of all men*  
(which is more than the concurrent opinion of the  
*Learned*) hath agreed it, as I shewed before;  
whatever become of *Solomon's Who knoweth?* in  
the precedent Reason.

And we find him not so over-shy, as here he  
would seem, of sifting some Questions of as deep  
Philosophy to the full as this; such as that, to-  
wards the close of his Book, of the Astral Spirit,  
and the Efficacy of Charms by Astral Influences,  
&c.

But is it in good earnest, a deeper enquiry to  
look into the nature of our own spirit, which we  
are most privy to, [*For who knoweth the things of*  
*a man, but the spirit of man which is in him?*] than  
to search into the Nature of Angelical Spirits  
without us? Is not that Candle of the Lord, our  
weak Understanding and Reason, more like to  
discover somewhat within doors, than to admi-  
nister any steady light abroad, where the stron-  
ger winds of uncertainty and opposition puff and  
blow about it?

Or lastly, Is there not as much of the Analogy  
of Faith, and the concurrent opinion of the Learn-  
ed about the Angels, as about the Humane Soul?



I conclude therefore from the Premises, that there was no reason at all why he should thus, once for all, exclude and except forth the Humane and Rational Soul, as not to be comprized in the same limits with Angelical Spirits, unless this only, that it was like to prove unserviceable to his Cause, nay an irreconcilable Enemy to it.

And so I come at length more directly to reflect upon what he discourseth of the Nature of Angels; which yet I should not at all have concern'd my self with, were not his Arguments level'd against their Incorporeity, as a thing utterly inconceiveable, which we can in no wise understand: or, if they proved no more but this, that Angels have certain Vehicles or Bodies joyned to them, as the Humane Soul hath, though of a more noble and refined sort; to which purpose I have also granted somewhat in the precedent Treatise, Ch. 11. §. 1.

*Mr. W's  
Speculations  
about  
the Corpore-  
ity of  
Angels,  
and how  
he blun-  
ders in the  
stating of  
this En-  
quiry.*

But he seems to me confused in his own understanding about them, and therefore he shuffles, or blunders, in the stating of this Question; making it all one to prove, that Angels are Corporeal, and that they have Bodies or Vehicles joyned to them; whereas there is an apparent difference between these two, and the one may securely enough be granted, as by many it is, where the other is yet denied. Take his own words.

'As much, saith he, as we contend for, is granted by Dr. More, in these words; [For I look upon Angels to be as truly a Compound Being, consisting of Soul and Body, as that of Men and Brutes—] And therefore, saith he, they must needs have an *Internum* and *Externum*, as the Learned and Christian Philosopher Doctor Fludd doth affirm, in these words: *Certum est igitur*

p. 167]

Ibid]

*tur inesse ipsis (sc. Angelis) aliud quod agit, aliud autem quod patitur; nec verò illud, secundum quod agunt, aliud quam actus esse poterit, qui forma dicitur; neque etiam illud, secundum quod patiuntur, est quicquam præter potentiam, hæc autem materia appellatur.*

So much the less reason still, say I, to exclude the Humane Soul from this Enquiry: But if this were all, he needed not to have taken so much pains about it, being done to his hands; or he might have spared at least those arguments, which prove somewhat more, if they prove any thing. He might have kept those Arrows by him, which are shot besides and beyond this Mark.

Ibid.

[ 'These Arguments do sufficiently and evidently prove, that Angels are either Corporeal, ' or have Bodies united to them, which is all one ' to our purpose, whether way soever it be taken. ] And again,

p. 21.

[ 'We have sufficiently proved, *saith he*, that ' they are corporeal, that is, that they have Bodies naturally united to them; and so have an ' *Internum*, or moving power, and an *Externum*, ' or a part moved.

To me therefore he seems to hide himself only, and darken the business by those terms of *simply and absolutely incorporeal*, which are so usual with him, and the only retreat he hath, upon occasion, to betake himself unto.

The Critical point of the present Controversie.

To be short, that which I search after, is the *Internum* in Angels, or *pars movens*, or *actus*, or *forma*, *illud quod agit*, in Dr. Flud's Philosophy, or the spiritual part of these compound Beings, or whatever Name he please to call it by, what that is: And if we can once find out that, as we have already the Humane Soul, incorporeal and capable of self-subsisting, what will become of that which he affirms so dogmatically, that our Facul-

sies

ties cannot conceive of an incorporeal Being? —

But now let us see the scuffle, and how demonstratively he lays about him.

1. 'Saith he, we lay it down for a most certain and granted truth, that God simply and absolutely is only a most simple Spirit, in whom there is no corporeity, nor composition at all: And, what other things soever, are call'd or accounted Spirits, are but so in a relative and respective consideration, and not in a simple and absolute acceptation. And this is the unanimous tenent of Fathers, School-men, and all other Orthodox Divines, agreeing with the plain and clear words of Scripture, as, *God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and truth.* And again, *Now the Lord is that Spirit.* — *John 4.24.* *2 Cor. 3.*

That God is a Spirit, (whatever some dispute) is, I grant, affirmed in holy Scripture; and, that he is the most simple and excellent Spirit, I as readily believe. But it is no-where in our Bible said, that God is the only Spirit; or that there are no other Spirits, but God. In the very same verse, which asserts God to be a Spirit, we also are allowed a Spirit too, to serve and worship him in. And, if we once take the liberty to turn all other Spirits, so call'd, into Bodies; I doubt the Incorporeity of the Godhead will be hardly defensible by it self: Because, though he be never so plainly and clearly named a Spirit in sacred Writ, yet, for all that, according to our Author's reasoning, he may be really corporeal, since other Beings, that are also stiled Spirits there, are avouched so to be.

But in truth a corporeal Deity, is a dull and strange idea of that omniperfect Being; and the very next step unto down-right Atheism, or the denial of him. For 'then he should be di-

p. 207.

'visible, as our Author rightly notes, which he  
'is not, nor can be, &c.

Πνεῦμα  
θεὸς ὡς  
μαγὶς —  
Nonnus in  
S. John 4.

Zanch. de  
oper. Dei  
par. 1. l. 2.  
c. 4.

Well, it is generally agreed among us, that  
God is a Spirit, a true Spirit, and the most per-  
fect Spirit, and so absolutely of himself, necessa-  
rily-existent, increate, and independent; and  
most simply and purely such, without all man-  
ner of composition, so much as that Metaphy-  
sical one of *Actus & Potentia*, allowed by the  
Schools to Angels, being immutable.

It follows then from hence, [*Si Deus est ani-  
mus* —] that we are able to conceive and frame  
a Notion of a most simple and pure Spirit,  
wherein there is no corporeity: For, otherwise,  
(as I have before mentioned) we affirm of God,  
we know not what; and that, which, for ought  
we understand, might be as well denied, as af-  
firmed of him. But then, that there are no cre-  
ated and dependent Spirits properly so called, no  
incorporeal Beings in the Universe besides in a sim-  
ple acceptation, but only so accounted in a rela-  
tive and respective consideration, hath no evi-  
dence at all from hence.

p. 202.

2. 'Therefore, saith he, we shall lay down  
'this following proposition, that Angels, being  
'created Substances, are not simply and abso-  
'lutely incorporeal; but if they be by any called  
'or accounted Spirits, can but be in a Relative  
'and respective sense, but that really and truly  
'they are corporeal. And this we shall labour to  
'make good, not only by shewing the absurdities of  
'that Opinion of their being simply spiritual, but by  
laying open the Unintelligibility of that Opinion.

Angels are  
not such  
Spirits in  
perfection  
as God is,  
and yet  
truly Spi-  
rits.

That Angels are not, cannot be such Spirits in  
perfection as God is, every one will grant: But are  
they not therefore truly Spirits? Doth not Ho-  
ly Scripture plainly and clearly call them Spirits,



as well as it doth God? *Are they not all ministring Spirits?* Is not Angel and Spirit equivalent there? as I have noted in the foregoing Treatise, *Ch. 1. Sect. 1.* — Or dare he presume to limit the Almighty? And say of the omnipotent God, to whom all things are possible, that he cannot create a truly incorporeal, as well as a corporeal substance? Is the one more unintelligible to us, than the other? Are all created substances therefore of necessity corporeal? — How is God then the *Father of Spirits*? How is the Soul of Man [a created substance for certain, inspired by God] yet a pure, immaterial, and incorporeal Spirit, as hath been plentifully acknowledged? Nay, what will become of the *internum & actus* of Angels too? —

He himself, how consonantly to his own arguments I cannot tell, doth else-where seem to assert the Devils or Evil Angels to be wholly or merely spiritual, in opposition to corporeal. ‘The Scriptures, *saieth he*, do fully and abundantly inform us of the Devil’s spiritual and invisible power. — *Master W. asserts Devils more spiritual than he allows other Angels.*

‘It is a spiritual, not a carnal, corporeal, or bodily armour, because the warfare is not against Flesh and Blood, but against spiritual wickedness in high places. Against spiritual Enemies, not against corporeal and carnal ones. For as the Enemies are, and the Warfare, so are the Armor and Weapons. — ‘Satan and his spiritual Army. — ‘No other kind of assaults but merely spiritual. *p. 47, 48. Ibid.*

Must not these Enemies now spoken of, the Devils, be concluded merely spiritual, if they are as their Assaults? Or, if our spiritual Weapons of Truth, and Faith, and Hope, &c. are suitable to their nature? Or, will he at last change these into Bodies too? —

And if the Evil Angels are merely spiritual,

why should the Good here be corporeal? The only reason, I think, of his inconstancy is zeal and eagerness to serve his present Hypothesis. *There* he was to oppose the tenet of a corporeal league with the Devil, &c. *Here* he is to defend that *All* created substances are corporeal. — But really he is concern'd, as much as any man, to solve or confute his own Arguments.

I will only touch upon the principal of them, wherein his greatest strength and confidence lies, and suggest *Responsions*, (if I may borrow that word so frequent in his Book) as I pass along.

His mighty  
arguments  
against  
the incor-  
poreity of  
Angels ex-  
amined.  
p. 207.

'If the Angelical nature, *saith he*, were simply and absolutely spiritual and incorporeal, then they would be of the same essential Identity with God, which is simply impossible. For the Angels were not created forth of any part of God's Essence; for then he should be divisible, which he is not nor can be, his Essence being Simplicity, Unity, and Identity it self; and therefore the Angels must of necessity be of an Essence of Alterity, and different from the Essence of God.—

p. 205.

This is such a piece of sublime Gibberish, as might tempt one to return back the Epithet, which he bestows upon *Suarinus*, (as he calls him) 'The great Weaver of fruitless Cobwebs.——

At this rate of arguing, like a Metaphysical Mountebank, he might prove every creature, as well as Angels, to be God, and of the same essential Identity with God; because every creature partakes of some real excellency or other communicated from God; and all excellencies, as well as Incorporeity, [*unum, verum, bonum,*] are of and in God; and all that is in God, is God. — The Soul of Man, doubtless, was *breathed in by God*, and in a peculiar manner *after the Image of God*, according to the holy Scriptures; and the  
Spirits

Spirits of Just men made perfect are *partakers of a Divine Nature*; and Angels there too are the *Sons of God*, who is, as hath been often remembered, the *Father of Spirits*. But will any one therefore be so mad as to say, These have God's Essential Identity, as he phraseth it, or no alterity to distinguish them from the Essence of God? Do not uncreate and created, infinite and finite, independent and dependent, &c. set these Spirits and the Father of them far enough asunder? or is eternal and necessary existence an Essential Attribute of the Idea of Spirit?—

This then is too weak and sandy a Foundation to support that Fabrick which he builds upon it, that [‘If men will trust their own cogitations and faculties rightly disposed, and not vitiated, then they must believe that Angels are corporeal, and not meerly and simply spirits, for absolutely nothing is so but God only. ] p. 207.

Again, saith he, ‘If Angels be simply incorporeal, then they can cause no Physical or local motion at all; because nothing can be moved but by Contact, and that must be immediate or virtual Contact; for the Maxim is certain, *Quicquid agit, agit vel mediatione suppositi*, as when one's hand doth immediately touch a thing, and so move it, *vel mediatione virtutis*, as when a man with a Rod or Line doth draw a thing forth of water. Both of these do require a corporeal Contact.—But what is absolutely incorporeal hath no superficies, &c. p. 208.

And this is an argument he seems to triumph in, as a Mathematician in his *εὐρημα*: Therefore is he pleased so much to repeat it: For so he had said before;

[‘If the Devil be consider'd as an incorporeal Nature, simply and absolutely; then it will follow, p. 147.

'low, that he cannot act upon any corporeal matter; because an incorporeal substance can make no contact upon a body, unless it were itself corporeal. For *quicquid agit, agit per contactum, vel mediatum, vel immediatum*; but both these are caused by the touch of one body upon another.—But that which is merely incorporeal, can perform neither.] And again;

p. 148.

[ 'I take it, saith he, to be one of the most firm Maxims that ever the Schools had, that *immaterial non agit in materiale, nisi eminenter, ut Deus.* ]

p. 198.

Which also he cites again in another place.

Rules and  
Laws of  
Bodies in-  
eptly ap-  
plied to  
Spirits.  
Lucret.

Now the Leading Mistake in all this Philophizing, is the inept applying of the Rules and Laws, proper and peculiar unto Bodies, unto Spirits also.

*Tangere enim & tangi, nisi corpus, nulla potest res.*

p. 203.

As before we observed his confounding of Imagination and Intellect. — And indeed he seems to allow of no mental notions or apprehensions, which do not first strike upon the senses. And this is that which makes him place the Idea of spirits or incorporeal beings among the unintelligibles. [ *The substance of a created Spirit, conceived as immaterial and incorporeal, must of necessity be utterly inconceiveable to any of our faculties:* ] Elegant! conceived as immaterial and incorporeal, and yet at the same time utterly inconceiveable. — But passing that, hear we his reason:

ibid.

[ *Because it hath no effects, operations, or modifications, that can or do operate upon our senses* ] This is *gratis dictum*. But the general importance of it relies upon another School-Maxim, which I wonder that he forgets to quote to us. [ *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerat in sensu.* ] And I could furnish



furnish him with more to this purpose.—

But now, what will become of the poor humane soul among the rest of its fraternity of Spirits, which is, as he hath told us, ‘by the unanimous consent of all men, as well as Divine Authority, a spiritual and pure, immaterial and incorporeal, and to be sure created substance? How come men to an unanimous consent in a notion utterly unintelligible and unconceivable?—Nay, what will become of all the spiritual and invisible World?—

p. 318.

p. 50.

Well, but the great difficulty remains: How can an immaterial act upon or move a material? This certainly is *Nodus vindice dignus*. But what if there be no *Oedipus* to unriddle it to us? What if neither we, nor any body else can sufficiently explain it? It is no more than that ignorance we must be contented with in other matters of occult Philosophy, where we subscribe often to the thing, though we cannot declare the manner of it.

*The difficulty of explaining the manner of things, must not make us deny what is otherwise evident.*

Our Author himself, in other cases, trains us up to this degree of modesty and humility: [‘The ultimate sphere of Natures activity and ability, saith he, is not perfectly known.’] [And ‘as it is thus in general, saith he, so in many particulars: We are ignorant of many Natural Agents that do work at a great distance, and very remotely, both to help and to hurt; the Weapon-salve, the Sympathetick-powder, the curing of Diseases by Mumial applications, by Amulets, Appensions, and Transplantation, which all have been, and commonly are ascribed unto Satan, when they are truly wrought, saith he, by Natural Operation.’]

p. 267.

Ibid.

But he cannot satisfy himself, or others, I presume, by what contact, mediate or immediate, of  
*suppositum*

*suppositum* or *virtus*, all these are performed.—  
 Or by what 'influence of the Stars, *quibus nota*  
 p. 338. 'sunt omnia, *que in naturâ existunt*; [as he tells  
 340. us out of *Paracelsus* and his Mystical Authors,  
 for whose vain traditional fancies he hath a pro-  
 found Veneration, whatever he hath for Doctor  
*Hammond*] or, under what 'right and favoura-  
 'ble Constellations, Words, Charms, Images, and  
 p. 339. 'Characters do receive their energy and vertue.—  
 Or, how 'certain Celestial Vertues and actions  
 'are sown into Gems, from whence they after-  
 'wards spring up no otherwise than seed, which  
 'doth fall from a Tree, and doth regerminate.  
 Though here, I confess, he hath some advantage  
 from a speculation of Phantasms.

*Angelini*  
*Gazæi*  
*pia Heli-*  
*laria.*

*Quid te fatigas hæc minuta scrutando?*  
*Pernice pennâ fretus, Icarî more,*  
*Scrutare potius digna mentis alata.*

p. 268. 'One great means, saith he elsewhere, of ad-  
 vancing those Tenents [of Witch-craft, &c.]  
 'hath been men's supine negligence in not search-  
 'ing into, and experimenting the power of Na-  
 'tural Agents, but resting satisfied in the sleepy  
 'notions of General Rules, and Speculative Phi-  
 'losophy, by which means a general prejudice  
 'hath been created against the most occult opera-  
 'tions of Nature, and Natural Magick.—

And may we not here retort this supine negli-  
 gence upon himself, in not observing the common  
 experience, which he and every one else hath of  
 the incorporeal spirit within him, actuating and  
 moving of the body, whilst he industriously op-  
 poseth this common experience by sleepy notions  
 of General Rules, and Speculative Philosophy,  
 concerning Bodie, ill adapted unto Spirits, and  
 their

their way of operation? It is enough, that we have this Domestick Argument of our own experience in the case to oppose to all his subtil arguments: As to a Sceptick, disputing against the possibility of motion, it were a sufficient and silencing Confutation, to move from him, and turn away.

Let him resolve us, how God who is a Spirit, the most simple and pure Spirit, acts upon matter; how the *Spirit of God moved upon the waters*, &c. for the word *Eminenter* is not intelligible enough to our faculty to be Englished.

But because this is too hard a Task, let him resolve us, how the immaterial and incorporeal Soul of Man moveth upon the body, or it's corporeal and animal Spirits; or by what *Gluten*, or *Vinculum*, and contact of superficies it is united to it's body; or how the body, *vice versa*, works upon and affects the immaterial Soul, which yet, as to the *τὸ ὅτι*, or *quod sit*, are matters of common sense, and universal experience.

—*Nam corpus onustum*

*Hesternis vitiis animum quoque pręgravat una.*

Horat.

Let him resolve us, how the *Internum* or moving part of Angels acts upon the *Externum*, or part moved, — and we shall soon be able to return him a satisfactory answer to this curious question, How an immaterial can operate upon, and move a material?

But, in the mean while, it is unreasonable to disclaim a certain Truth, because we cannot give account of the *Quomodo*, or manner of it.

And this is also abundant Answer to another of his puissant Arguments.

[If Angels, saith he, be absolutely incorporeal, p. 208.  
then

then they cannot be contained, or circumscribed in place, and consequently can perform no operation in Physical things.]

Contained and circumscribed in place are corporeal phantasmes, and so is place it self, as he describes it, proper unto bodies. But let him tell us, how the incorporeal spirit of man is in it's body, and that so as to perform undeniably Physical operations there, and we shall soon inform him of the *Ubi* of Angels, and their definitive being in it.

Let us see briefly, whether he hath better success from Scripture than from Reason, and I have done.

Some  
Texts of  
H. Scrip-  
ture confi-  
dered and  
vindicated  
from  
Mr. W's  
Excepti-  
ons.  
P. 214.

[The Scripture, saith he, informeth us, that in, or at the Resurrection, the bodies of men shall be as the Angels that are in Heaven: Sicut Angeli, Mark 12. 25. Now this Analogy, Comparison or Assimilation would be altogether false, if Angels had no bodies at all, but were meerly incorporeal. Then it would follow, that bodies after the Resurrection were made pure Spirits, and so ceased to be bodies; which is false, according to the Doctrine of S. Paul, who sheweth us plainly, that after the Resurrection they are changed in qualities into σώματα πνευματικά, spiritual bodies.-- 1 Cor. 15. 44. — From whence we conclude, that Angels have bodies, and that they are pure spiritual ones.]

I will not dispute against the matter of his conclusion, viz. that Angels have bodies, and that those bodies are pure and refined, such as he calls spiritual ones: For my concern is only to defend, that they are nevertheless incorporeal Beings, as the Humane Soul is, though united to a grosser body.

But yet I must add a word or two of his Scripture-premisses.

And



And first here is violence offer'd to the Text of our B. Saviour, by foisting in the word Bodies to it; for the Text is only thus, [ὅταν γὰρ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστῶσιν, ἔτε γαμήσων, ἔτε γαμήσονται· ἀλλ' εἰσιν ὡς ἄγγελοι ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς] *When they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels which are in Heaven.*—

And it is known well enough to be our Saviours Answer to the Question propounded concerning the Woman which had had seven Husbands, *In the Resurrection, whose Wife shall she be of the seven?*

Elsewhere, I remember, our Author puts in Souls instead of his Bodies here. [The Word of God doth particularly teach us the state and condition of Souls after death, that they shall be like the Angels in Heaven.] P. 44.

But whatever Truth there may be in either Proposition apart, and by it self, the H. Text, I am sure, mentions neither Bodies nor Souls: And if it did, we must not stretch Similitudes to make them argumentative beyond the thing they are brought for. They run not, we say, on all four.

It is enough that our B. Saviour there resolves us, that we [whether in Body, or Soul, or both] shall at the Resurrection be like unto the Angels in Heaven in Immortality, and an estrangement from the sensual inclinations and entertainments of this present imperfect state, such as Marrying, and giving in Marriage.—

And we may be like the Angels in many perfections, as we are said to be like to God himself, though they should have no Bodies; so that, even upon that supposal, this Analogy, Comparison or Assimilation (as he speaks) would not be altogether false; nor would it follow, that *Bodies after the Resurrection are made pure Spirits,*

*Spirits, and cease to be Bodies, as he infers.*

Of 1 Cor. 15. 44. Secondly, for Saint Paul's σώματα πνευματικά, or, *spiritual Bodies.*] Though upon the supposition, that Angels have Bodies, which for my part I gain-say not, it may be an ingenious translation, [*Such Bodies as Spirits or Angels have;*] yet it is sufficient to the purpose of the Apostle there, that our Bodies are participant of the spiritual perfection of immortality. Or, put on immortality, Ver. 53. *σῶμα ψυχικὸν* ] *quod ad tempus vivit dum anima adest. Anima est vox hujus vite* — πνευματικὸν] *habens in se vice anima Spiritum immutabilem, &c.*] *Crot. in Loc.* [See Ch. 3. Sect. 3. of the fore-going Treatise.] And so he cannot conclude from hence, that Angels have Bodies.

Of Psal. 104. 4. p. 211. That I be not over-tedious, I will end all with some few Reflections upon that noted Text of the Psalmist, *Who maketh his Angels Spirits, and his Ministers a flaming Fire*, Psalm 104. 4. 'From whence, saith our Author, the persons of the other opinion, such as *Aquinas* and the rest of the Scholastick Rabble, would positively conclude, that they are spirits and absolutely incorporeal; but fail of their purpose for these clear Reasons. —

His clear Reasons I shall examine anon, when we have first viewed the Text it self.

I can scarce pass over that Rude and Detracting Term of *Scholastic Rabble*. He should have been obliged, I think to a greater sweetness and civility to those, whom he owes so much to, and of whom he hath borrowed the chief ornaments of his Book, as to this Subject; those dear Maxim's I mean, which he relies so much upon, [*Imaginatio non transcendit continuum. Quicquid agit, agit vel mediatione suppositi vel virtutis; per contactum immediatum aut mediatum. Immateriale*

*non agit in materiale, nisi eminenter ut Deus.*] And, not to immind him of his own essential Identity, and *Alterity*, he can easily match their most Bombast and Barbarous Terms among his Occult and Magical Sophies.

But to the matter before us.

It is confess'd that the original word sometimes signifies Winds as well as Spirits; and the Hebrew Doctors so read it †. *Ventos Angelos suos*] † *Vitablus*  
*non ex accidente spirant, sed sunt Dei nuncii. Ignem* in Loc.  
*ardentem*] *fulgura*. So R. David \*. And Munster \* *Vicars*  
translates it, *Facit flatus nuncios suos, & ignem fla-* Decapla in  
*grantem ministros suos, q. d. 'Violent and sudden* Ps.  
*'Winds do execute his commands, and Fire per-*  
*'forms his pleasure: fulfilling his word, Ps. 148. 8.*  
And this is a great Truth.

But the holy Ghost in *Hebr. 1. 7.* as Master Ainsworth well notes, shews it to be spoken by the Psalmist of Angels properly, who are named *ministering Spirits*, Ver. 14. And our Physician allows, [*The Author of the Epistle to Hebrews must* P. 211.  
*needs be taken for the best Expositor of the words.*]

Yet among those, that conceive them of Angels, properly so call'd, there is some difference.

Some refer them to the respective Vehicles of Angels, either Aereal, (for Wind is but Air in motion) or Æthereal and Igneous. Thus Grotius, [*Sunt enim Angelorum alii Aerei, alii Ignei. Angelis corpora sed subtilissima non Pythagoræ tantum & Platonis Schola sensit, sed & Judæi veteres, & veteres Christiani.*] And to the same effect Doctor Hammond paraphraseth, [*Who, though he be able to do all things by himself to administer the whole World, as he first created it, by a word, by saying, and it was done; yet is he pleased to make use of the Ministry of Angels, who some of them in subtile Bodies of Air, others of Fire, come down and*

P

execute

execute his Commands here upon Earth.] And in his Annotations he tells us, [*As Angels and Ministers are but several names of the same Divine Creatures, so רוחות and Fire are but expressions of the several appearances of them, sometimes in Airy, sometimes in Flaming Clouds,—*] And hence I suppose, Beza in his Marginal Notes to Hebr. 1. 7. puts Cherub with Ps. 18. 11. and Seraph with Isa. 6. 2. — Junius and Tremellius interpret it, [*Angelis utitur nunciis, administrisque voluntatis & judiciorum suorum, adeò commode ut ventis & igne uti solet.*] He useth Angels for Messengers and Ministers of his Will and Judgments, as readily, as he is wont to do Winds and Fire. —

12. And to this same effect our Author chuseth to fense it, [*As the Winds, which is but a strong motion in the Air, and the shining of flaming Fire, are two of the most agile, and operative Agents, that are known to us in nature; so the Angels and Christ's Ministers are strong, quick, and most nimble, and powerful in performing their Offices and Administrations.*]

For my part, I see not any considerable inconvenience in these Expositions, unless where men will dogmatize with this Author, and say the words cannot otherwise be rationally understood. — And the nature of Angels may be yet incorporeal for all these vehicles assigned them; or notwithstanding the comparison of their operations to those most powerful and subtile Agents among Bodies, Wind and Flame. Our God, who is a Spirit, most simple and absolute, is also said to be a consuming fire, Hebr. 12. 29.

Who maketh his Angels Spirits] i. e. saith Master Ainsworth, spiritual substances. So differing from Christ, who is no made or created Spirit, but the Maker of all things. — And his Ministers a flaming



flaming fire,] i. e. 'effectual in their Administrations. Whence the Angels have appeared like 'Horses and Chariots of Fire. —

And Saint *Augustine*, who was none of the Scholastick Rabble, finds here both Nature and Office of these Celestial Creatures. [*Quæris nomen ejus Naturæ? Spiritus est. Quæris Officium? Angelus est. Ex eo quod est, Spiritus est. Ex eo quod agit, Angelus.* Enuarat. in *Pf.*] See Ch. 11. Sect. 1. of the fore-going Treatise. The word עֶשֶׂה; saith Doctor *Gouge*, [whose judgment possibly may bear some sway with him, as he tells us, 'Master *Baxter's* doth, with other 'Reformed and 'Orthodoxal Divines, such as 'tread not in the steps of *Arminius*, 'True Sons of the Doctrine of Church of *England*] intimates two things.

1. Creation. So God is said to have rested from all his Works, which he had made, Gen. 2. 2. And to have made Heaven and Earth, Revel. 14. 7. is meant created. Dr. G. in Hebr. 1. 7. Sect. 81.

2. Ordination or disposing things to this or that use. — And in both senses is this phrase. [He maketh] here used. He maketh them Spirits, that is, he createth them spiritual substances. He maketh them a flame of Fire, that is, he ordereth and disposeth them to be as a flame of Fire in doing his Will.]

Now let us hear our Author's clear Reasons against this later way of interpretation.

1. Saith he, The Text there cannot be rationally understood of their Creation, or of their creaturely Nature, but of their Offices and Administrations, because the word used there is not בָּרָא to create or form forth of nothing, but עֶשֶׂה, fecit, that is by ordering them in their Offices and Administrations. And again the word יוֹרֵחַ doth not always, or of necessity, signify an incorporeal thing, but that which is a Body, as the Winds, &c. His clear Reasons against the Scholastick interpretation of *Pf.* 104. 4. a short and defective. p. 211.

p. 106.

Divin.  
Decret.  
Epit. de  
Angelis.

With all becoming deference to his skill in the Hebrew Language [whereof and Greek, he hath been a 'Teacher in his younger years, as ne acquaints us] the word עָשָׂה, *fecit*, is sometimes used for Creation, as I noted even now out of Doctor *Gouge*: and *Maker* of all things, in our Creed, is as much as *Creator*: And therefore so also it may be taken by us here. And so *Theodoret*, none of the Scholastick Rabble neither, understands it, alledging this for a proof of the Angels creation. And so the Arabick version reads it, *Qui creavit*.

And though the other word רוּחַ doth not always and of necessity signifie an incorporeal thing, 'tis enough to decline the force of this Reason of his, that sometimes it doth signifie such, and possibly may do so. And the Arabick, if *Vicars* in his *Decapla* have rightly noted, is *absque corpore*.

P. 111.

But the Author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, (as he adds) must needs be taken for the best *Expositor* of these words, who doth quote them only for this purpose, to prove that *Christ in Dignity and Office* is far above the *Angels*, who are all order'd to serve and obey him, and are by their *Offices* all but *Ministring Spirits* sent forth to minister for them, who shall be *Heirs of Salvation*. By which it is manifest, that this place is to be understood of their *Ministrations and Offices*, and not of their *nature and substances*.

I readily consent with him, that the Author to the *Hebrews* is certainly the best *Expositor*; But then I positively deny, that he quotes them only to shew *Christs superiority in Office* above the *Angels*. For his design there is to manifest our blessed Saviour to be superiour to them in *Nature* as well as *Office*; as God above these *Creatures*, who are the best of *Creatures*, as well as  
Lord

Lord above these Ministers. *But to the Son,* he saith, *thy Throne, O God,* — as it follows immediately, *Ver. 8.* by way of opposition to what is here said of Angels. — And so it is far enough from being manifest, as he avers, that this place is not to be understood as inclusive of the nature and substance of Angels, their Creaturely nature, but of their Ministration and Offices only.

He yet adds,

2. *They can no more be merely and literally said to be Spirits, understanding Spirit to intend an absolute incorporeal substance, than his Ministers can be literally understood to be a flaming Fire. They must either be both literally true, which is absolutely absurd; or else this word must have a metaphorical interpretation, as they* (he means I suppose, the other words) *may and must have.* — P. 213.

Now I find nothing in this clear reason, but clear confidence, which asserts boldly, but proves nothing, and may therefore be answer'd by as bare a denial, or saying, that there is no *must* in the case, but the words may still be otherwise understood.

For why may not one word or sentence in the same period be literally true, and the other metaphorical; and so accordingly intended?

Or, what, if we should transpose the Subjects and Predicates, as some do? *Who maketh Spirits his Angels, and flaming Fire his Ministers.* Then both may be literally true without the least impeaching of Angels Incorporeity.

Or, what, if we should affirm both were literally true, only with this different respect, the former to the *internum* of Angels, the later to their *externum*, the former to their intrinsic nature, the later to their subtile Vehicles?

Or,

*Reflections upon Master Webster's*

Or, what, if we should render it, by a kind of *ἐν δὲ δυν*, *Who maketh his Ministring Angels Spirits, cloathed with aetherial Bodies.* Or, *Who maketh Spirits cloathed with flame-like Vehicles, his Ministring Angels.*

I mention these things, only by way of instance, to declare, that there are divers ways of escaping his clear Reasons in this matter without any absolute absurdity.

And now I leave it to the Christian Readers judgment to chuse his interpretation of these words, and pronounce of the whole Controversie, as he sees cause.

Δόξα τῷ Θεῷ τῷ πατρὶ τῶν πνευμάτων.

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FINIS.

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